Why it matters whether you are a contingentist by Leuenberger, Stephan
Leuenberger, S. (2019) Why it matters whether you are a 
contingentist. Analysis, 79(2), pp. 290-303. (doi:10.1093/analys/anz005) 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/177195/  
Deposited on: 26 February 2019 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
Why it matters whether you are a contingentist∗
Stephan Leuenberger
May 17, 2018
Karen Bennett’s Making Things Up starts with the claim that despite all
the differences between them, analytic philosophers share an interest in “claims
about what builds—or fails to build—what” (p. 2). Be that as it may, there is
another candidate for a shared interest: in generalizing, and identifying common
patterns in ostensibly different domains. It is that interest that Bennett pursues
in the book, by developing a general theory of building relations.
Making Things Up contains a wealth of insight, and many of its claims
and arguments would deserve extended discussion. But I shall restrict myself
to the discussion of Bennett’s characterization of building relations in chapter
3; and for the most part to just one of their defining features: that they are
necessitating. My paper is in two parts. In the first, I examine the specific
formulations of Bennett’s two versions of the modal constraint on building. In
the second, I discuss her claim that the choice between the two versions is of
little moment. I shall conclude that it matters greatly which one is correct:
what is at stake is what sort of ontology we end out with.
1 Two candidate definitions of building
Bennett aims to provide a characterization or definition of “R is a building
relation” (60). Two of the four conditions she puts forward as severally necessary
and jointly sufficient concern the formal features of the relation: it needs to be
irreflexive and asymmetric.1 Another condition requires a building relation to be
“generative”, roughly in the sense of backing certain explanations. My interest
here is in the remaining condition: that a building relation is necessitating, in
a manner to be specified.
One of the paradigmatic building relations is grounding, and Bennett’s
definiens is certainly meant to apply to it. It is controversial whether grounds
necessitate what they ground: so-called “necessitarians” say yes, while “contin-
∗Thanks to the participants in a work-in-progress seminar in Glasgow for very helpful
comments: Sam Chilovi, Miguel Garcia, Joaquim Giannotti, Salim Hire`che, Stephan Kra¨mer,
and Neil McDonnell. This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council
[grant number AH/M009610/1].
1As Bennett notes, irreflexivity is entailed by asymmetry. I shall follow her in using the
less concise but more explicit formulation.
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gentists” say no. Bennett considers a condition on building that is intended to
generalize the necessitarians’ stance on grounding (52):
N1 For all x and y and all building relations B, if x fully B’s y, then, necessarily,
x→ y.
Before discussing the merits of including N1 in a definition of building, I
shall clarify what it means.
Bennett uses a non-standard notation. The variables x and y can take enti-
ties of different ontological categories as values: objects, properties, facts, etc.
Since x and y need not be sentential variables, → cannot always be understood
as simply a material conditional. If we wish to be able to interpret instances of
N1 systematically, we might perhaps take → to be a two-place predicate that
applies to x and y just in case ‘f(x) ⊃ f(y)’ is true, where ⊃ is the material
conditional, and f(x) is “x exists”, “x obtains”, “x is true”, or “x is instanti-
atied”, depending on whether x is, respectively, an object, a fact, a proposition,
or a property.
When we instantiate N1 with a number of candidate building relations that
Bennett mentions, and use plural variables when appropriate, we obtain the
following conditions, with E, I,O to be read as “exists”, “is instantiated”, and
“obtains”, respectively.2
• If the xxs compose y, then (Exx ⊃ Ey).
• If x constitutes y, then (Ex ⊃ Ey).
• If y is the singleton of x, then (Ex ⊃ Ey).
• If P realizes Q, then ((I(P ) ⊃ I(Q)).3
• If the xxs micro-determine y, then (Exx ⊃ Ey).
• If f1, . . . , fn ground g, then (Of1 ∧ . . . ∧Ofn ⊃ Og).
Bennett then gives reasons to doubt some of these instances. What is per-
haps the most compelling counterexample—due to Shoemaker (1981)—concerns
realization: having one’s C-fibres firing realizes being in pain, but a system con-
sisting of a Petri-dish with a solution containing stimulated C-fibres may in-
stantiate the first property but not the second. Bennett also adds a further one
to the growing number of putative counterexamples to necessitarianism about
2For some of these relations, e.g. grounding, a “full” and a “partial” version may be
distinguished; unless I specify otherwise, I should be understood as talking about the former.
3It is unclear whether this is the intended reading of N1 for the case of realization. Perhaps
what is intended is one of the following claims in which I is used as a two-place rather than a
one-place instantiation predicate, to be read as “is instantiated by”: “∀x(I(P, x) ⊃ I(Q, x))”,
or “∀x(I(P, x) ⊃ I(Q, x))”. (Given a suitable instance of the Barcan Formula (respectively,
Converse Barcan Formula), the latter entails (respectively, is entailed by) the former.) They
are not of the form “f(P ) ⊃ f(Q)”, and it is not clear to me whether there is a systematic
interpretation of → that would generate them.
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grounding (crediting Jill North): facts about the intrinsic natures of Mary and
Tom ground the fact that she is taller than him, but they only necessitate it in
conjunction with facts about the curvature of space-time that are not intrinsic
to Mary or Tom (53).
So Bennett does not accept N1, and leans towards contingentism. One might
expect her to simply drop N1 from the definition of a building relation. But
she does not wish to do so without replacement, since she thinks that building
has something to do with necessitation. Within the contingentist camp, she is a
“circumstantialist”—holding that there must be circumstances which, together
with the builder, necessitates the buildee. She rejects a more radical version,
which she calls “indeterminism”: “that built entities fail to strongly globally
supervene on the rest of the world” (49).
Bennett thus tries to modify N1 in such a way that it avoids the counterexam-
ples to necessitarianism, but still rules out indeterminism. Since indeterminism
is introduced as the denial of a supervenience claim, one option would be to
formulate moderate contingentism in terms of supervenience.4 Bennett goes
down another route. Her modified necessitation requirement, intended to rule
out building indeterminism, reads as follows (60):
N2 Let C be some to-be-specified set of background conditions that includes
neither y nor anything that fully builds y. For all x and y, if x fully R’s
y, then, [x + C → y].
The background conditions that Bennett has in mind might be the presence
of certain laws of nature, the absence of certain blockers and defeaters, or,
in Shoemaker’s Petri-dish example, the C-fibres being suitably wired into a
complex nervous system.
N2 requires elucidation in three respects: first, how (x + C) → y is to be
interpreted; second, how the quantification over background condition is to be
understood; and third, what the restriction on admissible background conditions
is supposed to be. I shall consider them in turn.
Since C is a set of background conditions, I shall take f(C) to be the propo-
sition that every member of C obtains; and I shall assume that f(x + C) is
f(x) ∧ f(C).5 Given this, (x + C)→ y can be read as f(x) ∧ f(C) ⊃ f(y).
If it started with “let C be any set of background conditions . . .”, N2 would
be naturally read as universally quantifying over such a set C: for every C that
neither includes y nor anything that fully builds y, [(x + C) → y]. The use
of “some” in the place of “any” would normally be considered a mere stylistic
variant. But the addition “to-be-specified” suggests that C is not to be chosen
arbitrarily. If it were, N2 would arguably be equivalent to N1: for an empty set
C, f(x)∧ f(C) will strictly imply f(y) only if f(x) does by itself. The intended
reading of N2, then, is as an existential rather than as a universal quantification
4For the case of grounding, some relevant technical issues are discussed in Leuenberger
(2014); the generalization to building would not be straightforward, however.
5This does not answer the question what the referent of x + C is, but there may not be
any need to answer that question.
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over C: “there is some set of background conditions C . . .”. This ensures that
N2 is, as intended, logically weaker than N1 (on the assumption that there is
some background condition at all that satisfies the admissibility condition to be
discussed shortly). Clearly, N2 does not entail N1, but the converse does hold:
since what is necessary is closed under entailment, (f(x) ∧ f(C) → f(y))
follows from ((f(x)→ f(y)), regardless of what C is.
But what about the third issue, the restriction on admissible background
conditions? Bennett motivates the restriction as follows (52; the ellipsis is hers):
The restriction on C is to block cheap cases of necessitation-in-the-
circumstances. After all, if y itself can count as part of the circum-
stances, then anything you like necessitates y in the circumstances.
For example, let an atom in my left leg be x, and let some faraway
table—unconnected to x—by y. That arbitrary atom necessitates
the existence of the table in the circumstances . . . of coexisting with
the table.
The idea is that without the restriction, N2 would be trivially satisfied, and
might as well be left out from a definition of building relations.
The formulation of the restriction prompts the question what it is for a back-
ground condition to include an entity y. Presumably, we can take a background
condition or a set of background condition as a proposition, such as: that like
charges repel in inverse proportion to the square of their distance, or that no po-
tential blockers for Tom’s being conscious, given his physical state, are present.
There is no obvious way to distinguish between objects that are and objects that
are not included in a proposition construed as a class of worlds. On a Russellian
account, however, propositions are certain sequences of properties and objects,
and accordingly, we can take something to be included in a proposition just in
case it is a member of the sequence. At any rate, there is precedent for appeal to
such a notion, e.g. with Kit Fine’s “objectual content” of a proposition (1995),
and I shall grant its intelligibility.
The condition C is not only prohibited from including the buildee y, but
also anything that fully builds y. Bennett does not explicitly provide a ratio-
nale for this, but it is not hard to find one. Arguably, the existence of the atom
in Bennett’s left leg will necessitate the existence of the faraway table in the
circumstances of all the table’s atoms existing, and standing in suitable rela-
tions. These circumstances will not include the table, in the relevant sense of
“includes”, but they necessitate its existence by themselves.
As I read it, “anything that fully builds y” here means “anything that stands
in some building relation to y”. Formulated this way, the clause should set off
the bells of our circularity alarm system. In order to apply the definition to
determine whether a given relation R is a building relation, we may first need
to figure out whether a certain other relation R′ is a building relation. Bennett
claims to offer a definition (60) of the predicate “is a building relation”, and
definitions are standardly required to be non-circular. In the present case, this
would rule out a component clause of the form “anything that stands in some
building relation . . .”.
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One response would be to renounce the aim of giving a traditional definition,
and be content with offering conditions—stated in an idiom that includes the
term ‘building’ and its cognates—that are individually necessary and jointly
sufficient. But this would significantly scale down the ambition of the project.
Another response would be to follow the lead of Ramsey, Carnap and Lewis and
try to define a term by a theory in which it features itself. I shall examine how
this strategy might be implemented in the current context.
The first step is to re-formulate Bennett’s four conditions on a building
relation as a theory about the class B of building relations.6 The circularity
worry only arose in connection with N2, so the other conditions do not require
adjustment.7 The first clause of the theory of B is thus the following:
(1) Every R ∈ B is an irreflexive, asymmetric, and generative binary relation.
Condition N2 can be reformulated as follows:
(2) For every R ∈ B, and every x and y, if x fully R’s y, then [x + C → y]
for some C that does not include y, and that is such that for all R′ ∈ B
and all x′ included in C, x′ does not fully R′ y.
The conjunction of (1) and (2) is a theory of the class B of building relations.
The second step is to replace the term B, which names the class of building
relations, with a variable, to obtain the following:
(1′) Every R ∈ X is an irreflexive, asymmetric, and generative binary relation.
(2′) For every R ∈ X, and every x and y, if x fully R’s y, then [x + C → y]
for some C that does not include y, and that is such for all R′ ∈ X and
all x′ included in C, x′ does not fully R′ y.
The conjunction of (1′) and (2′) is the matrix of the Ramsey sentence of the
original theory. This matrix specifies a condition on classes, or a “role”, as I
shall sometimes say.
We can now ask what satisfies that condition. I shall call any class that
does a realizer of the theory. Note that such a realizer is not a building relation
such as composition or grounding. Rather it is class of such relations; perhaps
the seven-membered class {composition, constitution, singleton-formation, re-
alization, micro-determination, grounding, causation}. (Compare: realizers of
the folk theory of pain—players of the pain role—are not particular pains, but
rather properties such as being a C-fibre firing.)
If there is a unique realizer X of the theory, we can move to the third step:
defining B as that realizer. If there is no realizer, or if there is more than one,
6Alternatively, we could take B to be the property of being a building relation; or we could
use a plural expression rather than the singular B.
7N1 could be straightforwardly adjusted to that setting: every R ∈ B is such that for all x
and y, if x fully R’s y, then (x→ y).
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our attempt at definition has not succeeded.8 But is there are unique realizer?
In response to this question, would-be definers tend to resort to hope:
Many philosophers seem to think that unique realization is an ex-
travagant hope, unlikely in scientific practice or even impossible in
principle. . . .. I am . . . claiming that it is reasonable to hope that a
good theory will not in fact be multiply realized. (Lewis (1970, 83))
In a general discussion about “good theories”, this may be all we can say.
But here, with a particular theory in front of us, we can discuss the matter
further.
Both (1) and (2) are universal quantifications restricted to the members of
the candidate realizers. Trivially, the empty class is a realizer of the theory. We
thus need not worry that the theory has no realizers.9
In general, we can show that whenever X realizes the theory, and Y ⊆ X,
then Y is also a realizer. Hence if there is one intended realizer, there will also
be unintended ones. For example, if the intended realizer is the seven-membered
class mentioned earlier, there are at least 127 unintended ones.
To deal with this worry, we can strengthen the theory by adding a further
conjunct:
(3) No class that satisfies both (1′) and (2′) has B as a proper sub-class.
Clause (3) requires B to be maximal among the realizers of the theory previ-
ously discussed. In effect, (3) is the transposition into the Ramsey-style setting
of Bennett’s claim that irreflexivity, asymmetry, generativity and N2 are jointy
sufficient in addition to being severally necessary.
The corresponding open sentence is:
(3′) No class that satisfies both (1′) and (2′) has X as a proper sub-class.
The conjunction of (1′), (2′), and (3′)—the Bennett-matrix, as I shall call
it—specifies the building role.
We have seen that the conjunction of (1′) and (2′) has at least one realizer—
the empty class. It is likewise obvious that if that conjunction has only finitely
many realizers, then the Bennett-matrix will have at least one realizer. In
general, however, there is no such guarantee—for all we know, every realizer
might be properly included, as a subclass, in another realizer. Still, I shall
grant the assumption that the Bennett-matrix is realized.
Clearly, the addition of (3′) has had the intended effect: if any class realizes
the Bennett-role, none of its sub-classes does. One source of multiple realization
of the previous theory has thus been eliminated. Is that enough to secure a
8There are two views about the consequences of multiple realization: that the term—
‘building’, in the present case—lacks denotation, and that it denotes ambiguously (Lewis,
1999b). I take it neither outcome would constitute success.
9If the empty class turned out to be the only realizer, then the attempt at definition has









Figure 1: Two mutually undermining candidate building relations
unique realization? Here, there is reason for concern. To illustrate the way
that trouble might arise, I shall use a schematic toy example with two binary
relations R and R′. I shall make some stipulations about them, and then check
whether they count as building relations according to the specified criteria.
Assume first that both relations are irreflexive, asymmetric, and generative.
So the class {R,R′} realizes (1′), as do its sub-classes {R}, {R′}, and ∅. Suppose
now that in world w, there are exactly three objects, a, b, and c, and that aRc
and bR′c hold; all other atomic sentences involving R and R′ are false. In world
v, a exists and nothing else; and in world v′, b exists and nothing else. We can
picture the situation in figure 1. (You may think of R as material causation, R′
as formal causation, and c as a hylomorphic substance.)
In such a situation, neither a→ c nor b→ c is necessary, such that neither R
nor R′ would satisfy N1. Assuming that w, v, and v′ are all the relevant worlds,
a+ b→ c does hold, however. So it might seem that both R and R′ satisfy the
“circumstantialist” necessitation requirement: the existence of a necessitates
that of c given the background condition that b exists, and the existence of b
necessitates that of c given the background condition that a exists.
Assume that these are the only candidate background conditions. Then it
follows that {R,R′} does not satisfy (2′)—the two candidate building relations
undermine each other’s candidacy. For a stands in R to c, but the only back-
ground condition together with which the existence of a necessitates that of c
includes something, namely b, that stands in R′ to c. It follows with (2′) that
if R′ ∈ X, then R is not.
How plausible is the assumption that this argument depends upon, that the
only candidate background conditions include the existence of a and b respec-
tively? It seems to me that these are indeed the only natural candidates in this
situation, and that insisting that there must be further ones in w would be ad
hoc and threaten to trivilize N2. Dialectically, the assumption seems a fair one
to make.
Clearly, {R} and {R′} each satisfy (2′) as well as (1′). Since {R,R′} does
not, as we have seen, they also satisfy (3′), and thus the Bennett-matrix as a
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whole. We have two realizers, and cannot unambiguously define B after all.
The condition (2′) thus leads to a kind of “constructional exclusion”: the
relations R and R′ exclude each other as ways of building c. I take it, however,
that this is an unwelcome result quite independently of its vitiating a Ramsey-
style definition. Intuitively, it should be possible, in the case described, for both
R and R′ to be building relations.10 This would suggest that N2, despite being
logically weaker than N1, is still too strong a necessitation requirement.
What should be done in response to this problem? One option would be
to look for a yet weaker version of the requirement, perhaps in terms of super-
venience rather than in terms of necessity and a conditional. But the simpler
option would be to simply drop the requirement. In the book, Bennett first in-
troduces N2 along with the conditions of irreflexivity and asymmetry, and then
asks whether a further condition is needed. She answers that question in the
affirmative, and opts for adding generativity. But once we have generativity as
well as irreflexivity and asymmetry, we can go back and ask whether we still
need a necessitation requirement. Recall that the purpose of the requirement
was to rule out building indeterminism. It may well turn out that no generative
relation is indeterministic in the relevant sense. After all, generation is expli-
cated in terms of explanation, and explanation has often been taken to entail
necessitation in the circumstances. The covering-law model of explanation is
one example; the sufficiency requirement in certain difference-making accounts
of causation another (List and Menzies (2009)).
The question whether indeterminism is ruled out by Bennett’s other con-
ditions, specifically generativity, is a large one, and beyond the scope of this
article. If it is, then no modal condition needs to be included in the definition
of building. I should note that even if that were so, it would still be an inter-
esting and non-trivial project to formulate modal conditions that are satisfied
by building relations as a consequence of that definition.
2 Choosing between the two definitions
I have cast doubt upon whether Bennett’s N2 adequately captures circumstan-
tialism about building. In this section, I wish to prescind from such difficulties.
I shall grant, for the sake of the argument, that N2, or a suitably modified ver-
sion of it, works as intended. The focus of my discussion will be the way that
Bennett characterizes the choice between N1 and N2.
Recall that N1 appears to fall afoul of counterexamples, such as C-fibres
firing in a Petri dish. While I gave the impression that Bennett rejects N1,
her position is actually more nuanced. She says that the choice between being
a necessitarian and a circumstantialist “is not an important decision; nothing
10This point is confirmed by considering a modified version of our scenario where R′ = R.
Here, we get the result that {R} (= {R′}) does not satisfy (2′), and hence that only the empty
set satisfies the Bennett matrix. In that modified case, the definition formally succeeds, since
the Bennett matrix has a unique realizer. Still, the definition does not seem to be materially
adequate. See also the preceding footnote.
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deep turns on it” (54; emphasis hers); and that “[r]eally, the choice . . . is just a
matter of bookkeeping”.
These remarks are prima facie puzzling. Bennett’s aim, in the part of
the book that I am discussing, is to characterize the class of building rela-
tions. She considers two characterizations, one that includes N1—the “narrow”
characterization—and one that includes N2—the “broad” characterization. To
fulfil her aim, Bennett surely must tell us which one is correct. Aren’t two
characterizations for one class of relations one too many?
In the rest of this paper, I shall discuss what Bennett might have in mind
here, and urge that the choice does matter after all.
One possible reason for denying the importance of the choice would be the
thought that even though N1 and N2 are not logically equivalent, there is no
relation that satisfies the broad but not the narrow characterization. Being
generative, by itself or in conjunction with N2 and asymmetry, might already
entail N1. The classes picked out would then turn out to be the same.
However, I very much doubt that this is what Bennett has in mind. If it
were, she would surely tell us so; and I shall shortly present a quote that would
seem to rule out that interpretation.
If the choice between the broad and the narrow characterization was purely
terminological, that would be another possible reason to deny it significance.
Of course, once we have decided to use ‘building’ as a technical term, nothing
deep turns on the question about how we choose to define it.
Once more, this cannot be what Bennett has in mind. Her claim that the
choice does not matter is not just a reminder of the arbitrariness of the relation-
ship between words and what they stand for. For her definition of a building
relation is not purely stipulative. Rather, she is trying to identify a theoreti-
cally or metatheoretically important class of relations, and she has articulated
a few constraints and desiderata on the definition: the definition needs to apply
to certain paradigms, such as constitution, composition, and grounding; and
the class is supposed to be natural, in some sense that is intuitive but hard to
analyse.
Perhaps, though, we still need not choose because whilst the narrow and
the broad characterization differ from each other, they both include the major
paradigms and exclude the major foils, and are both theoretically important.
There are two useful concepts of building, much like there are two useful concepts
of property, if Lewis (1983a) is right, or two concepts of causation, if Hall (2004)
is right, or two concepts of metaphysical necessity, if Rosen (2006) is right. Yet
once more, such an interpretation seems uncharitable. The other philosophers I
just mentioned all insisted that we should pay attention to the distinction, and
go on to explore what hangs on the question whether we are deploying one or
the other in a given context. The existence of two natural classes going by one
name is a significant discovery. This attitude is strikingly different to Bennett’s.
Bennett elaborates on the claim that the choice between N1 and N2 is “just
a matter of bookkeeping” in the following passage:
I can have intuitive building bases and the somewhat ungainly im-
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plementation of the modal requirement, or I can have a cleaner im-
plementation of the modal requirement and uglier, more complex
building bases. In the latter case, much ordinary building talk must
be treated as invoking mere partial builders. (54)
Two moves are being made here, which I will try to tease apart.
The first move is to suggest that either N1 or N2 may be acceptable if we are
prepared compensating changes in what we say about the candidate building
relations. The idea seems to be that the choice is to be made based on aesthetic
criteria, and that the merits and demerits of N1 and N2 balance each other out.
Suppose I believe that having C-fibres firing realizes being in pain; or that
facts about the intrinsic natures of Mary and Tom ground the fact that she is
taller than him; or that every fact about the world is grounded in the positive
facts. Given that there is no necessitation in these cases, it seems that I have
to either reject N1, or deny that realization or grounding are building relations.
Since the latter are among the paradigms of building, my only option seems
to be to reject N1—unless I am willing to give up my belief in the pertinent
instances of realization and grounding! As Duhem and Quine have urged, we
can choose to accept almost anything if we are prepared to restore consistency
by making compensating changes in our web of beliefs.
However, it seems to me that this move does not yet justify the claim that
the choice between N1 and N2 does not matter. Many of us would accept
the Duhem–Quine thesis without taking it to undermine the significance of our
ordinary doxastic choices. Moreover, the considerations that Bennett adduces
hardly show that honours are even between N1 and N2. Why should the fact
“that it allows a cleaner implementation of the modal requirement” be a weighty
reason to give up my “intuitive building bases”, i.e. my first-order beliefs about
grounding and realization, not to mention causation, which Bennett also counts
among the building relations? I suspect that this fact carries weight only to the
extent that we are convinced that building or grounding should be characterized
at least partly in modal terms, and that all contingentist alternatives to N1 are
cumbersome. If we are not—and we need not be, at least at that stage in the
argument—it is not clear whether N1 forms part of an attractive package of
views for us.
But Bennett’s second move, in the last sentence of the quote, puts a very
different complexion on the choice: it is not between world views, but rather
between rival semantic hypotheses about ‘grounds’ and other words in the build-
ing family, as they are used in philosophical discourse. As I read Bennett, she
is claiming that the dispute between those who wish to include N1 and those
who wish to include N2 in the definition of building is merely verbal. After all,
the claim that some choice is a matter of bookkeeping is closely related to the
claim that disputes about what the correct choice is are verbal disputes.11
11The claim that a dispute between necessitarians and circumstantialists is merely verbal
would appear to entail that the parties do not just use one word differently, but a whole range
of words, including ‘builds’, ‘grounds’, ‘realizes’, ‘composes’, and so on. In my view, this
makes the diagnosis prima facie implausible, but I shall not press that point.
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Suppose that Connie the contingentist and Mustafa the necessaritarian are
disputing about the truth of the following quantified grounding claims:
(1) The fact that Mary is taller than Tom is grounded in some intrinsic facts
about them.
(2) The fact that there are no angels is grounded in some positive facts.12
Connie accepts (1) and (2), while Mustafa rejects them on the basis that
the putative grounding facts do not necessitate that Mary is taller than Tom,
or that there are no angels.
Suppose that they are then told that ‘grounded’ can express either of two
relations: partial grounding, or else strict grounding, which is necessitating by
stipulation. Accordingly, (1) and (2) can be disambiguated to (1p), (2p), (1s),
and (2s), which result from replacing ‘grounded’ in (1) and (2) by ‘partially
grounded’ or ‘strictly grounded’, respectively. When asked to evaluate those
sentences, Connie and Mustafa agree that (1p) and (2p) are true, while (1s) and
(2s) are false. There is no longer any dispute!
It is widely taken to be a hallmark of verbal disputes that they tend to disap-
pear once certain distinctions are made. According to the influential account of
Chalmers (2011), we can test whether a disagreement is verbal by the “method
of elimination”: we bar the use of a certain term that occurs in a sentence
over which there are disagreements, and ask whether the disagreement persists.
What happened when non-specific ‘grounds’ was eliminated from (1) and (2)
lends credence to the hypothesis that there is no substantive disagreement be-
tween Connie and Mustafa.
But this test method is by no means decisive, as Chalmers notes:
If a language has a limited vocabulary, then it might be that once
one bars a key expression, one can no longer even formulate any issue
that might potentially resolve the original issue. (Chalmers (2011,
530))
Connie may indeed complain that once ‘grounding’ is barred, she can no
longer express her view. I shall argue that the word ‘grounded’ does not mean
the same as ‘partially grounded’ in her mouth, contrary to what the above story
might have suggested. Grounding need not be partial by dint of violating the
necessitation requirement.
With respect to (1), Connie agrees that intrinsic facts about the two people
(INT) necessitate that Mary is taller than Tom (f) only in conjunction with
facts about the global curvature of spacetime (g). But she might insist that the
former are nonetheless a full ground, with the latter functioning as a background
condition with respect to f ’s being grounded in INT.13
12The plural expression “some positive facts” may stand for an empty plurality, in case one
of our disputants is open to the idea of zero-grounding.
13Connie may or may not believe that there are facts Γ such that g and Γ fully ground f .
Indeed, INT may be such a Γ, since full grounds can be parts of other full grounds (disjunctions
with two true disjuncts furnish the canonical example).
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Connie’s rejection of the suggestion that the dispute about (1) is merely
verbal turns on the distinction between grounds and background conditions.
Bennett takes this distinction to be “invidious” (55), and I shall not defend it
here. But I wish to argue that the substantive character of disagreement about
(2) can be defended without relying on that distinction.
Since Connie accepts (2), she does not think that the absence of angels
ontologically commits her to anything but positive states of affairs—where a
state of affair is, roughly, speaking, a “sparse” fact, as opposed to an “abundant”
or “pleonastic” one, corresponding to a true sentence. Since Mustafa rejects
(2), on the other hand, he must conclude that f is either ungrounded, or else
has something beyond positive facts among its grounds. Whether he opts for
fundamental negative states of affairs, totality states of affairs, or something yet
different, he will incur an ontological cost.
So disagreement about whether (2) is true has led Connie and Mustafa to
adopt different ontologies. In this dispute, grounding plays a role in regimenting
ontological discourse. Our ontology needs to be rich enough to account for all
the phenomena. Philosophers who commit to less are liable to be branded as
“ontological cheats”—a charge Mustafa might level at Connie—and philosophers
who commit to more fail to adhere to the maxim of Ockham’s razor—Connie’s
criticism of Mustafa. On a plausible regimentation, our ontology accounts for a
phenomenon just in case it either includes it, or includes full grounds for it. In
Bennett’s terminology, this is the constraint that our ontology shall be complete
(109).14 Both Connie and Mustafa agree with this—that is part of the reason
why grounding is a useful term for them to use in their philosophical discussion.
In contrast, neither thinks that partial grounding can play such a role, and only
Mustafa thinks that strict grounding can.
Given the link between grounding and ontology, the question whether we
are contingentists or necessitarians is thus closely linked to the question whether
there is negativity in the world, as opposed to our representations thereof. I take
it that this is a substantive dispute about what exists, not just about what gets
to be called ‘ground’ rather than ‘background condition’. If the dispute were to
seem verbal today, then our robust sense of reality must have been somewhat
blunted in the 100 years since 1918, when Russell, in “The Philosophy of Logical
Atomism”, gave his famous account of a lecture at Harvard:
One has a certain repugnance to negative facts. . . . You have a feel-
ing that there are only positive facts, and that negative propositions
somehow or other got to be expressions of positive facts. When lec-
turing on this subject at Harvard I argued that there were negative
facts, and it nearly produced a riot: the class would not hear of there
being negative facts. (Russell (1956, 211))
I conclude that given what is at stake, the choice between necessitarianism
and contingentism is not merely a matter of book-keeping.
14Bennett introduces completeness in this sense in her discussion of fundamentality, while
I am putting it to use in an account of ontological commitment. The two uses are linked if
we are ontologically committed to all and only the fundamentalia.
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